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SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS IN STATE COURT 
Jennifer J. Johnson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, Congress has gradually usurped the power 
of state regulators to enforce state securities laws, and the power of state 
courts to adjudicate securities disputes.  In 1996, as part of National 
Securities Market Improvement Act (NSMIA),1 Congress preempted 
state regulatory authority over nationally traded securities, and over 
Rule 506 private placements, which represent the bulk of private 
offerings.2  In 1998, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act (SLUSA)3 in order to restrict most securities fraud class 
actions to federal court, where they would be subject to the 
jurisprudence of Rule 10b-5 and the strict procedural requirements of 
the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).4  SLUSA 
precludes both state and federal courts from adjudicating certain class 
actions that are based upon state statutory or common law and that 
allege a misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of 
nationally traded securities.5  In 2005, Congress enacted the Class 
Action Fairness Act (CAFA),6 which, among its other provisions, 
further restricts state courts from adjudicating all but the smallest 
securities class actions.7 
A major impetus behind these preclusion and preemption statutes was 
to curtail abuses by class action lawyers.  The PSLRA in particular was 
motivated by concerns that plaintiffs‘ counsel were untrustworthy and 
filed frivolous lawsuits primarily for their own advantage.8  The PSLRA 
 
 * Erkine Wood Sr. Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School.  The author would like to 
thank her research assistant Robert S. Scott for his invaluable help on this project. 
 1. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 
[hereinafter NSMIA] (codified in scattered sections of 15 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 2. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
151 (2010) (examining legislative history of NSMIA). 
 3. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 
[hereinafter SLUSA] (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  
 4. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub.L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
[hereinafter PSLRA] (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2006). 
 6. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 [hereinafter CAFA] 
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006). 
 8. For example, Senator Alfonse D'Amato speaking in favor of the enactment of the PSLRA 
stated: ―It is time to reform the securities class action litigation from a moneymaking enterprise for 
lawyers into a better means of recovery for investors,‖ and that it was time to ―go after the greatest 
abuse that is taking place, which is lawyers who do not represent the general public but represent 
1
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therefore imposes strict procedural hurdles, and contains standards for 
the appointment of lead plaintiffs‘ counsel.  SLUSA, in combination 
with CAFA, ensures that class counsel cannot avoid the PSLRA‘s 
procedural impediments by filing in state court.  There is evidence, 
however, that the collective effect of these statutes has been to drive 
smaller plaintiffs‘ firms out of the traditional securities litigation market, 
and perhaps strengthen larger firms—the very firms Congress sought to 
police.9  This Paper presents data that dispossessed plaintiffs‘ lawyers 
increasingly have turned to filing alternative class actions in state court. 
This Paper evaluates the impact of congressional preemption and 
preclusion upon state court securities class actions.  Utilizing a 
proprietary database, this Paper presents and analyzes a comprehensive 
dataset of over 1,500 class actions filed in state courts from 1996–
2010.10  In Part II, this Paper details the permissible space for state 
securities class actions in light of congressional restrictions embodied in 
SLUSA and CAFA.  Part II explains that these statutes have relegated 
state court securities class actions primarily to: (1) claims involving 
corporate governance, or merger and acquisition (M & A) transactions 
based upon the law of the defendant‘s state of incorporation; (2) class 
actions involving securities that are not nationally traded when the 
controversy is ―local‖; (3) class actions with a relatively small number 
of plaintiffs; and (4) possibly class actions solely premised on 1933 
Securities Act (1933 Act) claims. 
Part III presents the state class action filing data detailing the 
numbers, classifications, and jurisdictions of state class action cases that 
now occupy state forums.  First, as expected, the data indicates that 
there are few traditional stock-drop securities class actions litigated in 
state court today.  The few cases that survive preemption tend to involve 
alleged fraud in private offerings against promoters and other 
fiduciaries.  Second, in spite of the debate over the impact of SLUSA 
and CAFA on 1933 Act claims,11 very few plaintiffs attempt to litigate 
these claims in state court.  Finally, the number of state court class 
actions involving M&A transactions is skyrocketing and now surpasses 
similar claims filed in federal court.12  Moreover, various class counsel 
file their M&A complaints in multiple state jurisdictions and, 
increasingly, outside of Delaware. 
 
themselves.‖  141 CONG. REC. 35,238, 40 (1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato). 
 9. See generally, Howard M. Erichson, CAFA's Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1593, 1618–19 (2008) (detailing the impact of PSLRA and CAFA on the class action bar and 
suggesting that the plaintiffs‘ bar is now more concentrated). 
 10. See infra Part III.A. 
 11. See infra Part II.C. 
 12. State court class actions involving merger and acquisitions (M&A) are permissible under 
SLUSA pursuant to the Delaware Carve-Out.  See infra notes 109–19 and accompanying text. 
2
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Part IV describes the growing problems generated by the large 
number of multi-forum M&A class action suits and the burdens they 
impose on plaintiffs‘ counsel, the defendants and their counsel, and the 
judiciary.  Part V suggests potential outcomes resulting from the 
proliferation of the M&A suits in multiple state courts.  Part VI 
concludes that absent effective state coordination, further congressional 
preemption is possible, if not likely. 
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS IN STATE 
COURT 
Most private securities litigation in the federal courts involves Section 
10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (the 1934 Act),13 and Rule 
10b-5,14 both of which prohibit fraud in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities.15  From its inception, courts have consistently implied 
a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5.16  While Congress 
occasionally legislates in the Rule 10b-5 arena, the judiciary has largely 
established the elements of the implied cause of action.  As set forth by 
the Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,17 to 
establish a prima facie case under Rule 10b-5, a private plaintiff must 
generally plead and prove: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission 
by the defendant,18 (2) scienter,19 (3) a connection between the 
 
 13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).  The 1934 Act confers 
exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts to adjudicate disputes arising from the act.  Id. § 27(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 78aa. 
 14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 15. Rule 10b-5, drawn from section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, provides: ―It shall be unlawful for any 
person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of 
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.‖  Id.  While there is robust judicial precedent interpreting Rule 10b-5(b), prohibiting material 
omissions and misstatements of fact, there are very few cases directly addressing clauses (a) and (c), 
sometimes cumulatively deemed ―fraud by conduct.‖  Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities 
Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61 (2009); cf. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S. 
148, 158–60 (2008) (discussing fraud by conduct in the context of secondary actors). 
 16. See, e.g., Kardon v. Nat‘l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).  An 
overwhelming majority of lower courts adopted the Kardon holding that Rule 10b-5 included a private 
right of action, a position ultimately endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1975.  Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975). See also, Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 79 (citing 
Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)); Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976). 
 17. 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005). 
 18. Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, ―An omitted fact is material if there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to 
vote.‖  TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
3
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misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security,20 
(4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission,21 (5) economic 
loss,22 and (6) loss causation.23 
Critics of federal securities class actions argue that even meritorious 
Rule 10b-5 class actions do not provide sufficient deterrence or 
compensatory benefits to justify their costs.24  Conceptually, many 
securities class actions involving secondary market transactions simply 
impose a wealth transfer upon public shareholders, resulting in a net loss 
to investors after accounting for transaction costs, including attorneys‘ 
fees.25  Directors and Officers (D&O) liability insurance typically 
insulates malfeasant managers, leaving only the corporation and the 
insurer to pay the damages.26  The offending corporation‘s value is 
decreased by the amount of the award returned to the plaintiff-
shareholders, either directly or as a result of increased D&O insurance 
premiums.27  Diversified investors are particularly disadvantaged 
 
 19. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193.  To establish scienter, the plaintiff must prove the defendant 
intended to ―deceive, manipulate, or defraud‖ the plaintiff.  Id.  Among the federal circuit courts, this 
intent requirement is satisfied by knowledge and varying degrees of recklessness.  Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007).  In Tellabs, the Supreme Court also held 
that to successfully plead scienter, ―the inference of scienter must be more than merely ‗reasonable‘ or 
‗permissible‘—it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong in light of other explanations.  A 
complaint will survive . . . only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and 
at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.‖  Id. at 324. 
 20. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730–55 (acknowledging a private cause of action under Rule 
10b-5 and establishing standing requirements limited to ―purchasers‖ or ―sellers‖ of securities). 
 21. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–50 (1988) (affirming that reliance is a necessary 
element of Rule 10b-5 private actions and establishing a rebuttable presumption of reliance based upon 
the ―fraud-on-the-market‖ theory); see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 
U.S. 148, 159–66 (2008) (holding that the reliance element of Rule 10b-5 requires that investors be 
aware of the defendant‘s role in the challenged transaction). 
 22. In Dura, the Court cites 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) as authority for the necessity of proving 
economic loss, although the cited provision actually refers to loss causation.  Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 
U.S. at 341. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Johnson & Edward Brunet, Critiquing Arbitration of Shareholder 
Claims, 36 SEC. REG. L. J. 181, 183–85 (2008) (summarizing critiques of class action securities 
litigation). 
 25. Id.; see also Richard A. Booth, Class Conflict in Securities Fraud Litigation (Villanova 
Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1811768 
(detailing wealth transfer issue in the context of class actions); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the 
Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 
1549–56 (2006) (noting corporate entity rather than individual wrongdoers normally funds the 
settlement); INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 78–79 (2006), 
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (explaining 
that recovery in securities class actions is circular); Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious 
Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 698–700 
(arguing liability of corporate enterprise imposes costs of fraud upon innocent shareholders). 
 26. Coffee, supra note 25, at 1546–53. 
 27. Booth, supra note 25 (arguing that stock drop class action claims should instead proceed as 
4
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because they often purchase and sell shares in the same firm at different 
points in time, which can leave them sharing in the loss but ineligible to 
claim any portion of the damages.28  Moreover, evidence that securities 
class actions produce a deterrent effect is inconclusive.29 
In an effort to curb what it deemed vexatious legislation, Congress in 
1995 enacted the PSLRA.30  Among its many provisions,31 the PSLRA 
imposes lead plaintiff criteria and severe procedural hurdles for Rule 
10b-5 class action plaintiffs.  For example, under the PSLRA, in order to 
defeat a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must, before discovery, state with 
particularity facts detailing the fraud and ―giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind 
(scienter).‖32 
A. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 
Congress soon confronted allegations that civil plaintiffs were 
attempting to avoid the pleading and other procedural hurdles imposed 
by the 1995 PSLRA by filing civil claims in state court.33  Though the 
 
derivative suits). 
 28. Coffee, supra note 25, at 1556–57; see also Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory 
Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 281 (2009) (―The compensation justification for a cause of action 
against the issuer for a misstatement in a disclosure filing is very weak, particularly given the high 
transaction costs associated with securities litigation.‖); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities 
Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 
10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1314 (2008) (―[M]ost commentators now agree that the prototypical 
Rule 10b-5 class action (i.e., one brought against a nontrading corporation for its officer‘s fraud-on-the-
market) cannot be defended on compensatory grounds.‖). 
 29. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and 
Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual 
Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627 (2007) (arguing that deterrence value of enterprise liability is 
slightly positive but hard to justify given its costs); Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in 
Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1504 (1996) (proposing a shift from damages to civil 
penalties); Jennifer Arlen & William Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: 
Theories and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691; (presenting empirical evidence that enterprise liability 
does not sufficiently deter fraud).  Not everyone agrees that securities class actions are in need of 
reform.  See, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV 497 
(1997) (defending compensatory and deterrent values of securities class actions); Joel Seligman, The 
Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994) (arguing that the rationale of the PSLRA is 
unfounded). 
 30. PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 31. The PSLRA provides for a stay of discovery pending a motion to dismiss, 15 U.S.C. § 78-
u4(b)(3)(B) (2006), 15 U.S.C § 77z-1(b)(2006); contains a statutory safe harbor, unavailable under most 
state blue sky laws, for forward-looking statements, § 78-u5(c), § 77z-2; establishes lead plaintiff 
criteria for class actions, § 78-u4(a)(3), § 77z-1(a)(3); and creates a system of proportionate liability, 
§ 78u-4(f), § 77(k)(f)). 
 32. § 78-u4(b)(2)(A). 
 33. See Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006) (―To stem this ‗shif[t] from Federal to 
State courts‘ and ‗prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being 
used to frustrate the objectives of the Reform Act, SLUSA §§ 2(2), (5), 112 Stat. 3227, Congress 
5
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empirical evidence of a shift to state court was inconclusive,34 in 1998, 
Congress enacted SLUSA,35 which restricts most securities fraud class 
actions to federal court, where they are subject to the federal 
jurisprudence of Rule 10b-5, and the strict procedural requirements of 
the PSLRA.36 
SLUSA is a preclusion statute that prevents both state and federal 
courts from adjudicating certain class actions that are based upon state 
statutory or common law and that allege a misrepresentation in 
connection with the purchase or sale of ―covered securities.‖37  SLUSA 
defines a covered security as any security that is traded nationally and 
listed on a regulated national exchange.38  The definition also includes 
most senior securities of the same issuer.39  SLUSA does not apply to 
securities issued by non-public companies nor does it apply to privately 
placed debt securities such as mortgage bonds, even when issued by 
public companies.40 
SLUSA contains exceptions; notably, the ―Delaware Carve-Out‖ 
preserves state court jurisdiction over any otherwise ―covered class 
action . . . that is based upon the statutory or common law of the state in 
which the issuer is incorporated‖ when the claims involve 
communications directed to shareholders in connection with their voting 
rights, such as in M & A transactions.41 
SLUSA applies to class actions or groups of lawsuits pending in the 
same courts that raise common issues of law and fact, and when 
combined, seek damages on behalf of fifty or more persons.42  SLUSA 
 
enacted SLUSA.‖) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 10 (1998); S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 3–4 (1998)). 
 34. Compare Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The 
First Year's Experience a Statistical and Legal Analysis of Class Action Securities Fraud Litigation 
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (John M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics, Working Paper No. 140, 1997), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=10582 (documenting 
shift to state court), and Michael Perino, Fraud And Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities 
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273 (1998) (same), with Lisa L. Casey, Shutting the Doors to 
State Court: The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 27 SEC. REG. L.J. 141 (1999) 
(providing an in-depth analysis of the competing empirical studies), and David M. Levine & Adam C. 
Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California's Blue 
Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1, 1–9 (1998) (questioning whether any empirical data indicates a post PSLRA 
migration by plaintiffs to state court), and Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal 
Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998) (questioning the 
justification for SLUSA). 
 35. SLUSA, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 36. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82.  
 37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f), 77p(b)–(f) (2006). 
 38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(3), 77r(f)(3) (2006). 
 39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(f)(3), 77r(b).  A senior security has ―priority over any other class as to the 
distribution of assets or payment of dividends.‖  § 77r(d)(4). 
 40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(5)(B), 77p(f)(3). 
 41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(3)(A), 77p(d). 
 42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii), 77p(f)(2).  Initially, SLUSA would have prohibited all private 
6
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does not impact individual securities claims43 unless they are part of a 
series of lawsuits that ―proceed as a single action.‖44  Courts can 
combine individual suits, even over the objection of the plaintiffs, if the 
plaintiffs have consolidated the actions for any purpose.45  If the 
combined lawsuits involve more than fifty plaintiffs, SLUSA preclusion 
applies.  SLUSA creates federal removal jurisdiction over covered class 
actions,46 so SLUSA interpretations have primarily been the province of 
the federal courts as they consider remand petitions.47 
SLUSA precludes state class action claims involving 
misrepresentations in connection with securities transactions even if the 
state cause of action does not mirror Rule10b-5.  For example, lower 
courts have held that SLUSA precludes state court class actions 
premised on state statutory or common law provisions that, contrary to 
Rule 10b-5, do not require scienter or reliance.48  In Merrill Lynch v. 
Dabit, the U.S. Supreme Court held that SLUSA precluded a class 
action based upon a state law providing for liability for 
misrepresentations that caused investors to ―hold‖ securities.49  The 
Court found that the allegations were ―in connection with the purchase 
 
actions in state court involving nationally traded securities.  See Securities Litigation Improvement Act 
of 1997, H.R. 1653, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Perino, supra note 34, at 334 (arguing that Congress 
should preclude all state private actions to prevent class action plaintiffs from eluding the discovery stay 
of the PSLRA by filing an individual action in state court).  
 43. See S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 7 (1998) (The Senate Banking Committee stated that it ―does not 
intend for the bill to prevent plaintiffs from bringing bona fide individual actions simply because more 
than fifty persons commence the actions in the same state court against a single defendant.‖).  
 44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II), 77p(f)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (2006); see, e.g., In re Enron Corp. 
Sec., 535 F.3d 325, 339–42 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding cases filed by a single law firm involving 196 
plaintiffs were ―proceed[ing] as a single action‖ under SLUSA, even though each case involved fewer 
than 50 plaintiffs).  Individual suits brought by state entities cannot be grouped with concurrent class 
actions.  §§ 78bb(F)(3)(B), 77p(d)(2). 
 45. 15 U.S.C.§§ 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)(II), 77p(f)(2)(A)(ii)(II); see, e.g., Instituto De Prevision Militar 
v. Merrill Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating cases can be involuntarily combined if 
plaintiffs have agreed to consolidation for discovery or any other purpose); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 236, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting cases consolidated for pretrial purposes 
qualified as a ―group of lawsuits‖ under § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii)); Gordon Partners v. Blumenthal, No. 02-
Civ-7377, 2007 WL 431864, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007) (same); In re Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n 
Sec., Derivative, and ―ERISA‖ Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 25, 30–33 (D.D.C. 2007) (concluding that two 
lawsuits brought by plaintiffs who opted out of a class action were ―covered class actions‖ once 
consolidated with the original claim). 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(2); Proctor v. Vishay Intertech. Inc., 584 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(citing § 78bb(f)(1)–(2)) (noting SLUSA creates a federal preclusion defense and it alone establishes 
federal removal jurisdiction if a claim is covered under the statute). 
 47. In addition, federal remand decisions are not appealable.  Kircher v. Putman Funds Trust, 
547 U.S. 633 (2006).  State courts, however, may adjudicate the propriety of a federal court remand 
even if they are not often called upon to do so.  Id. at 646. 
 48. See, e.g., Anderson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. 521 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 
2008) (―Plaintiffs did not have to allege scienter or reliance for SLUSA to apply.‖); Siepel v. Bank of 
Am., N.A., 526 F.3d 1122 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 49. 547 U.S. 71 (2006). 
7
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or sale of securities,‖50 even though such claims could not have 
proceeded under Rule 10b-5 due to the purchaser-or-seller standing 
requirement imposed by Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.51  The 
Dabit Court stated that courts should broadly interpret SLUSA52 in order 
to carry out the congressional intent to limit abusive class actions.53  In 
the wake of Dabit, courts have liberally construed the ―in connection 
with‖ element of SLUSA, and have closely examined the substance of 
state complaints to prevent claimants from trying to elude preemption by 
―artful pleading.‖54 
B. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) 
Even if SLUSA preclusion is not available, defendants may still 
remove many securities class actions to federal court under the 2005 
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).55  CAFA confers original federal 
jurisdiction over any class action56 with at least 100 claimants, minimal 
diversity,57 and an aggregate amount in controversy of at least $5 
 
 50. Id. at 89. 
 51. 421 U.S. 723, 738–55 (1975). 
 52. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85 (―[I]t is enough that the fraud alleged ‗coincide‘ with a securities 
transaction—whether by the plaintiff or by someone else.‖). 
 53. Id. at 82. 
 54. See, e.g., Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 129 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that SLUSA 
preclusion applies to fiduciary claim because ―allegation of fraud would be difficult and maybe 
impossible to disentangle from the charge of breach of the duty of loyalty‖); Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, 
N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 310–11 (6th Cir. 2009) (―For the same reason a claimant does not have the broader 
authority to disclaim the applicability of SLUSA to a complaint, he cannot avoid its application through 
artful pleading that removes the covered words from the complaint but leaves in the covered 
concepts.‖); City of Chattanooga v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 3:09CV516(WWE), 2009 WL 5184706 
(D. Conn. Dec. 22, 2009) (holding SLUSA precludes state action for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust 
enrichment resulting from a misrepresentation ); Levinson v PSCC Servs., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-
00269(PCD), 2009 WL 5184363, at *12 (D. Conn. Dec. 23, 2009) (―Plaintiffs' claims of common law 
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and aiding and abetting conversion and statutory theft are precluded 
by SLUSA because a misrepresentation or other fraudulent conduct is a necessary element of these 
causes of action.‖).  In Barron v. Igolnikov, No. 09 Civ. 4471(TPG), 2010 WL 882890 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
10, 2010), the court found that SLUSA precluded a class action involving the Bernie Madoff ponzi 
scheme even though Madoff only purported to purchase and sell covered securities. 
 55. CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 56. Under CAFA, the term ―class action‖ includes mass actions, which are claims on behalf of 
more than 100 persons, even if not styled as class actions.  28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(11)(A)–(B) (2006) 
(defining mass actions).  Cf. Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 952–57 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 187 (2009) (noting CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(iii), specifically states that a 
mass action shall not include claims that are joined upon the motion of a defendant); Anwar v. Fairfield 
Greenwich Ltd., 676 F. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (adopting holding of report and recommendation 
of Magistrate that derivative suit on behalf of fund with 700 shareholders was not a mass action subject 
to removal under CAFA).  
 57. Under CAFA, the diversity requirement is satisfied if ―any member of a class of plaintiffs is 
a citizen of a State different from any defendant.‖  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).  Therefore, plaintiffs cannot 
destroy diversity jurisdiction by simply choosing class representatives from the defendant‘s state or 
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million.58  CAFA provides original federal jurisdiction over designated 
class actions, including those based upon state law claims, and does not 
entirely eliminate the class action as a means to adjudicate the state 
claims.59 
CAFA contains exceptions for class actions involving covered 
securities as defined by SLUSA,60 for class actions that concern internal 
corporate governance,61 and for claims relating to the terms or 
ownership of the security itself.62  Otherwise, state antifraud claims 
involving privately placed and non-traded securities, such as limited 
partnership offerings or privately placed mortgage-backed securities, 
appear to fall squarely within CAFA.  Such claims generally cannot 
proceed as class actions in state court if more than one hundred plaintiffs 
are involved. 
Unlike SLUSA preclusion, CAFA preemption is not absolute.  For 
example, the act requires federal courts to decline jurisdiction under the 
―Home State Controversy Exception‖—when more than two-thirds of 
the class members as well as the primary defendants are from the forum 
state.63  The federal court must also decline jurisdiction under the ―Local 
Controversy Exemption‖ when: (1) more than two-thirds of the putative 
class members are from the forum state, (2) at least one defendant is a 
citizen of the state if the class seeks significant relief from that 
defendant, (3) the defendant‘s conduct constitutes a significant basis of 
the class claims, (4) the principal injuries occurred in the forum state, 
and (5) no similar class action have been filed against any of the same 
 
naming and in-state defendant.  A corporation is a citizen of the state of incorporation and the state 
where it maintains its principal place of business.  § 1332(c)(1).  A corporation‘s principal place of 
business is its ―nerve center‖ where ―a corporation‘s officers direct, control, and coordinate the 
corporation‘s activities.‖  Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010). 
 58. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).  CAFA allows aggregation of the amount in controversy to reach the 
$5 million dollar prerequisite.  § 1332(d)(6).  Also, there ―is no requirement in a class action brought 
originally or on removal under CAFA that any individual plaintiff‘s claim exceed $75,000.‖  Cappuccitti 
v. DirectTV, Inc., 623 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 59. CAFA expands federal jurisdiction over pendant state law claims as long as the class action 
meets CAFA's jurisdictional requirements, regardless of whether the court would otherwise exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction. Erichson, supra note 9, at 1618–19. 
 60. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(A). 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(B). 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(C).  In Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli, 527 F.3d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 2008), 
the Second Circuit held that this third CAFA exception was limited to disputes over the meaning of the 
terms of the security itself, such as the interest rate.  See also Greenwich Fin. Serv. Distressed Mortgage 
Fund 3 LLC v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 603 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2010) (dismissing appeal on grounds that 
CAFA does not permit appellate review of remand orders when issue involves terms of a security).  
 63. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B); see Lao v. Wickes Furniture Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1050 
(C.D. Cal. 2006).  In Lao, the court held that ―Under the ‗home state controversy,‘ district courts must 
decline jurisdiction where two-thirds or more of the class members and the ‗primary‘ defendants are 
citizens of the state where the action was originally filed.‖  Id. (citing § 1332(d)(4)(B)).  The definition 
of ―primary‖ defendant has not been without controversy. 
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defendants within a three-year period.64  CAFA gives discretion to the 
courts to decline jurisdiction in the interest of justice, looking at the 
―totality of the circumstances,‖ when between one-third and two-thirds 
of the plaintiffs reside in the same state as the defendant.65 
C. Class Actions Alleging 1933 Act Claims 
State class action filings alleging violations of the 1933 Act66 have 
presented problematic interpretations under both SLUSA and CAFA.  
The 1933 Act imposes liability for misrepresentations in connection 
with public offerings of securities.67  Section 22 of the 1933 Act itself 
provides for concurrent jurisdiction between state courts and federal 
district courts.68  Originally, Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act specifically 
provided that no case ―brought in any state court of competent 
jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States.‖69 
1. The Impact of SLUSA on 1933 Act Claims 
In 1998, Congress amended Section 22 of the 1933 Act to allow 
removal pursuant to SLUSA.70  Ordinarily, a public offering of 
securities under the 1933 Act results in nationally listed and traded 
 
 64. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(a).  The terms ―significant basis‖ and ―significant relief‖ have been 
the subject of litigation.  See, e.g., Graphic Commc‘ns Local 1B Health & Welfare Fund A v. CVS 
Caremark Corp., 725 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854–55 (D. Minn. 2010).  In CVS Caremark, the court wrote, 
―Significant relief‖ is ―a significant portion of the entire relief sought by the class,‖ and the ―significant 
basis‖ provision requires a comparison of ―the local defendant‘s alleged conduct to the alleged conduct 
of all the defendants.‖  Id. (quoting Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1167 (11th Cir.2006), 
Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir.2009)). 
 65. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3).  In exercising this discretion, the court must consider: ―whether the 
claims asserted involve matters of national or interstate interest; whether the claims asserted will be 
governed by laws of the State in which the action was originally filed or by the laws of other States; 
whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction; whether 
the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the 
defendants; whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed in all 
proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any 
other State, and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed class is dispersed among a 
substantial number of States; and whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class 
action, 1 or more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other 
persons have been filed.‖  Id. 
 66. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006). 
 67. Securities Act of 1933 Act § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2006); 1933 Act § 11, 15 
U.S.C. § 77k (2006).  Section 12(a)(1) of the 1933 Act also provides a rescission remedy to purchasers 
when the seller has violated section 5 of the 1933 Act, which requires securities to be either exempt or 
registered.  Such claims, however, do not involve misrepresentations and therefore would not fall within 
SLUSA‘s preclusion.  15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1). 
 68. Securities Act of 1933 Act § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (2006). 
 69. Id. § 22(a). 
 70. Securities Act of 1933 Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2006). 
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securities that would fall within SLUSA‘s definition of covered 
securities.  Arguably, therefore, any resulting state court class action 
claims would be subject to removal under SLUSA.  Some federal 
district courts, however, citing the statutory text of SLUSA, have held 
that state court class actions asserting only 1933 Act claims may not be 
removed under SLUSA.  These courts reason that SLUSA defines a 
covered class action as one ―based upon the statutory or common law of 
any State or subdivision thereof,‖ and containing specified allegations in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.71  Claims based upon 
the 1933 Act, however, are federal law claims not arising under the 
―statutory or common law of any State.‖  Therefore, under a literal 
reading of SLUSA‘s terms, its removal provisions do not apply.72 
Conversely, some courts have interpreted SLUSA to authorize or 
require removal of 1933 Act class actions to federal court.  One 
proffered theory is that quite apart from its removal provisions, SLUSA 
stripped state courts of subject matter jurisdiction over covered class 
actions raising 1933 Act claims, leaving federal courts with sole subject 
matter jurisdiction over these class actions.73  Another theory suggests 
that the SLUSA removal provisions, properly understood, trump the 
Section 22 anti-removal statute even when the class action complaint is 
solely grounded on federal 1933 Act claims.74 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Federal Courts adopting this view include: Unschuld v. Tri-S Sec. Corp., No. 06 Civ. 2931-
JEC, 2007 WL 2729011 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007) (granting remand); Irra v. Lazard Ltd., No. 05 CV 
3388RJDRML, 2006 WL 2375472 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006) (same); Pipefitters Local 522 & 633 
Pension Trust Fund v. Salem Commc‘ns Corp., No. CV 05-2730-RGK, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14202 
(C.D. Cal. June 28, 2005) (same); In re Tyco Int‘l, Ltd., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D.N.H. 2004) (same); 
Nauheim v. Interpublic Grp. of Co., No. 02-C9211, 2003 WL 1888843 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2003) (same); 
Haw. Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine Corp., No. 03-cv-0714-BTM (JFS), 2003 
WL 23509312 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2003) (same); In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 
590 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (same).  Contra Rubin v. Pixelplus Co., Ltd., No. 06-CV-2964(ERK), 2007 WL 
778485 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007) (denying remand); Pinto v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-0062 
(FLW), 2007 WL 1381746 (D.N.J. May 7, 2007) (same); Rovner v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-
178 (FLW), 2007 WL 446658 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2007) (same); Lowinger v. Johnston, No. 3:05-CV-316-H, 
2005 WL 2592229 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2005) (same); In re King Pharms., Inc., 230 F.R.D. 503, 505 
(E.D. Tenn. 2004) (same); Kulinski v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., No. Civ.A.C-2-03-412, 2003 WL 
24032299 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2003) (same); Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (C.D. 
Cal. 2003) (same); Alkow v. TXU Corp., Nos. 3:02CV2738K, 3:02 CV 2739 K, 2003 WL 21056750 
(N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003) (same). 
 73. See, e.g., Knox v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  Accord Michael Serot, 
(Mis)Interpreting SLUSA: Closing the Jurisdictional Loophole in Federal Securities Class Actions, 7 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 162 (2010). 
 74. Courts adopting this view include: Rubin, No. 06-CV-2964(ERK), 2007 WL 778485 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007) (denying remand); Pinto, No. 07-0062 (FLW), 2007 WL 1381746 (D.N.J. 
May 7, 2007) (same); Rovner, No. 07-178 (FLW), 2007 WL 446658 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2007) (same); 
Lowinger, No. 3:05-CV-316-H, 2005 WL 2592229 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2005) (same); In re King 
Pharmaceuticals., Inc., 230 F.R.D. 503, 505 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (same); Kulinski, No. Civ.A.C-2-03-412, 
2003 WL 24032299 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2003) (same); Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2003) 
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These various rulings by federal district courts are not as of yet 
constrained by federal appellate opinions because SLUSA did not 
amend the general prohibition on interlocutory appeals of remand 
decisions.75  Therefore, different federal judges, sometimes even in the 
same court, have reached differing conclusions on the viability of 1933 
Act class action suits in state courts in the aftermath of SLUSA.76 
2. The Impact of CAFA on 1933 Act Claims 
CAFA does not impact 1933 Act claims involving nationally-traded 
securities defined under SLUSA as covered securities.77  For non-
covered securities, courts face conflicting statutory provisions: CAFA, 
requiring removal under most circumstances, and Section 22 of the 1933 
Act, forbidding removal.  Currently, circuit courts disagree on the 
relationship between CAFA and Section 22 of the 1933 Act.78  The 
Ninth Circuit, relying upon the canon of statutory construction that the 
more specific statute controls the general statute, held that 1933 Act 
claims are not removable under CAFA.79  The Seventh Circuit rejected 
the Ninth Circuit‘s analysis of statutory canons, finding that Section 
22(a) of the 1933 Act was not a subset of CAFA, and therefore was not 
the more specific statute.80  On the merits, the Seventh Circuit reached 
the opposite conclusion, finding upon the basis of the statutory language 
 
(same); Alkow, Nos. 3:02CV2738K, 3:02 CV 2739 K, 2003 WL 21056750 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003) 
(same). 
 75. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); see Kircher v. Putnam Trust Funds, 547 U.S. 633, 640 (2006).  In 
Kircher, the court held that ―An ‗order remanding or declining to remand a case to the State court from 
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.‘‖  Id. (quoting § 1447(d) in a post-
SLUSA Supreme Court opinion). 
 76. For example, in the Eastern District of New York, some judges take the broad approach to 
interpreting the SLUSA and refuse to remand 1933 Act class actions, while others take the narrow 
approach and remand the cases to state court.  Compare Irra, No. 05 CV 3388 RJDRML, 2006 WL 
2375472 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006) (granting remand), with Rubin, No. 06-CV-2964(ERK), 2007 WL 
778485 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007) (denying remand).  In Luther v. Countrywide Financial Corp., No. 
B222889, 2011 WL 1879242 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. May 18, 2011), a California Appellate Court held that 
1933 Act class action claims can proceed in state court if they involve non-covered securities under 
SLUSA. 
 77. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(A) (2006). 
 78. Unlike SLUSA, CAFA specifically provides that remand decisions are appealable under the 
discretion of the appellate court.  Compare SLUSA, 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(4), with CAFA, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1453(c)(1) (2006). 
 79. Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting 
§ 11 action was not removable because § 22 of the 1933 Act is the more specific statute and trumps 
CAFA).  Ironically, upon remand, the state court found that SLUSA deprived the state court of 
jurisdiction and dismissed the proceeding, a decision that itself was subsequently reversed.  Luther v. 
Countrywide Financial Corp., No. B222889, 2011 WL 1879242 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. May 18, 2011).  
 80. Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 561–62 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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that CAFA permitted removal of 1933 Act claims.81  This split 
obviously provides some opportunities for forum shopping if a plaintiff 
desires to keep a Section 11 case in state court.82 
D. The Remaining Space for State Securities Class Actions  
Together, SLUSA and CAFA relegate state securities class actions 
primarily to (1)claims involving corporate governance, or M & A 
transactions that are based upon the law of the defendant‘s state of 
incorporation; (2) class actions involving securities that are not 
nationally traded when the controversy is ―local‖; (3) smaller class 
actions where the plaintiff class does not exceed fifty in the case of 
SLUSA covered securities, or one hundred in the case of non-covered 
securities; and (4) perhaps class actions solely premised on claims under 
the 1933 Act. 
III. THE DATA SET—SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS IN STATE 
COURTS (1996–2010) 
A. Overview of the Data 
The data in this Paper is comprised primarily of state securities class 
action filings identified by Securities Class Action Services (SCAS) 
from 1996 through 2010.83  SCAS maintains a proprietary database to 
serve its institutional investor clients who participate in class action 
filings or settlements.  This database draws primarily from state courts 
that maintain electronic, searchable data on class action filings,84 and 
 
 81. Id. at 562–63 (expressly disagreeing with Luther and holding that securities class actions 
alleging 1933 Act claims are removable under CAFA unless they fall within a statutory exception); see 
also N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. HarborView Mortg. Loan Trust 2006-4, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting Congressional intent and the rule of recency mandate that removal power under 
CAFA supersedes section 22(a)).  For support of the HarborView position, see Laura L. Arp, New 
Jersey Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-4, Resolving Irreconcilable 
Conflicts, 88 NEB. L. REV. 853 (2010). 
 82. But see Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Stanley, 605 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2009), where the 
federal district court judge in California, before ruling on the remand motion (which under Ninth Circuit 
precedent the court would probably grant), transferred the case to the federal district court in New York, 
where the plaintiff had commenced another cause of action.  Under HarborView, the applicable 
precedent in the New York district court, the remand motion would likely fail. 
 83. Risk Metric Group/Securities Class Action Services is a division of Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) that provides a range of services relating to risk management, corporate governance, and 
financial research and analysis for their institutional investor clients.  Securities Class Action Services, 
ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/scas (last visited Apr. 28, 2012) (―SCAS offers complete research 
and analysis on all federal, state and SEC settlements, with the industry's most comprehensive database 
on securities class action litigation.‖). 
 84. SCAS reports that the following state jurisdictions maintain searchable class action filing 
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from SEC filings for public companies.85  Given Delaware‘s dominance 
in corporate charters for public companies,86 the use of SEC filings as a 
primary source of data may tend to over represent Delaware 
corporations in the sample.87  SCAS augments its data with (1) available 
published judicial orders and opinions,88 (2) published news reports and 
law firm web announcements, and (3) information it receives from 
attorneys and others interested in the database.  I augmented the SCAS 
dataset using reported federal remand decisions.  Also, I augmented the 
database by correlating federal securities class action filings with their 
state court counterparts.89 
This database is necessarily incomplete and omits some cases filed in 
courts that do not maintain electric filing data systems.  It also omits 
cases in jurisdictions where trial courts do not ordinarily produce 
judicial opinions or other public announcements concerning the cases.  
While the database is fairly comprehensive regarding complaints filed 
against public companies,90 there is currently no feasible way to reliably 
 
data bases: California: Santa Clara County, Santa Barbara County, Contra Costa County; Oklahoma: 
Tulsa County; Texas, Dallas County; and Arizona, Maricopa County. 
 85. SEC disclosure rules require companies to ―describe briefly any material pending legal 
proceeding‖ in their disclosure documents.  See Item 103 Legal Proceedings, Regulation SK, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.103 (2011).  Class action filings would ordinarily be deemed ―material‖ under the test of TSC 
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976), in that ―there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important‖ in making an investment decision.  Id. at 449.  Therefore, the 
SCAS review of SEC disclosure documents, including reports filed on Forms 10K, 10q, 8k, as well as 
filings specific to M & A transactions, should reveal almost all class action filings against public 
companies.  
 86. Delaware remains the chosen home of 63% of Fortune 500 companies and in 2010, 76% of 
all new U.S. Initial Public Offerings (IPOs).  DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT (2011), available at http://corp.delaware.gov/10CorpAR.pdf. 
 87. This will not necessarily impact the jurisdiction in which the class action complaint is filed. 
See infra notes 121 & 124 and accompanying text and Figure 11. 
 88. Given that the vast majority of securities class actions settle, the most useful judicial 
opinions and orders will necessarily consist of preliminary trial court orders.  Unfortunately, from the 
perspective of researching state court proceedings, very few state trial courts outside of Delaware, New 
York, and California consistently publish orders or opinions.  Indeed, only a very small percentage of 
federal trial courts issue published opinions.  See David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. 
Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 710 (2007) (―Overall, 
of the 5,736 judicial actions we recorded, only 178—3%—came accompanied by opinions.‖).  
Augmenting this class action filing data with other sources of class action filings reduces this selection 
bias.  See David Hoffman & Christina Boyd, Disputing Limited Liability, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 853, 856 
(2010) (noting analysis of these complaints and dockets advances a ―new and robust form of legal 
realism‖); Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should We Study District Court Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL‘Y 83, 103 (2009) (viewing case documents helps to avoid ―the problems of selection bias 
introduced by relying only on opinions or published opinions‖). 
 89. SCAS as well as other organizations such as the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearing 
House track federal securities class action filings.  The federal courts maintain a searchable database for 
class action filings, making this data more reliable.  Nonetheless, different researchers analyze the data 
quite differently.  See infra note 95. 
 90. One study, however, suggests that the SCAS database underreports M & A objection suits 
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track state court class action filings against private company defendants 
that do not file SEC reports.91  Still, there is reason to believe that, given 
the nature of securities class actions, most suits will target public 
companies,92 and omitted data from private company cases will be 
largely insignificant.93 
SCAS codes it data in several ways, including categories of 
allegations.  Upon review, however, I found the coding to be incomplete 
and, in some cases, inaccurate. 
Therefore, I reviewed the complaints, settlement documents and other 
available material to recode the data.  In studying the nature of the 
allegations, the vast majority of state securities class actions fell into one 
of three general categories: (1) M & A objection suits; (2) 1933 Act 
claims (§ 11 and § 12); or (3) ―other.‖  The nature of the allegations in 
the ―other‖ category primarily includes fraud allegations with respect to 
non-nationally-traded securities, claims against broker or dealers or 
brokers and dealers, and breach of fiduciary duty claims apart from 
M&A transactions. 
This Paper tracks class actions in state court relating to the purchase, 
sale, or ownership of securities, including fiduciary duty claims arising 
from M & A transactions.94  The data counts all securities class action 
complaints filed in a particular state jurisdiction regardless of the 
ultimate disposition of the case.95  Complaints consolidated in a single 
 
even within its own search criteria.  See C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Litigation in Mergers and Acquisitions 
(Vanderbilt Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 10-37, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1722227 (finding 127 state M & A class actions 
filings in 1999, and 114 in 2000).  The authors derived these 1999–2000 statistics from all filings in the 
Delaware Chancery court involving M & A transactions during 1999 and 2000.  To access data from 
cases filed in non-Delaware state courts, the authors examined SEC filings for companies involved in 
announced M & A transactions.  In comparison, the SCAS reports 59 M & A cases for 1999 and 88 for 
2000.  While the difference may be attributable in part to different methods of counting the complaints, 
it serves to highlight the difficulty in capturing accurate data for class actions filed in state court. 
 91. This difficulty has led most researchers to concentrate their studies upon federal courts, 
public companies, or a single jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Neil Marchand, Where‟s the Party, Do Class Action 
Plaintiffs Really Prefer State Court? (Jan. 6, 2009) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334923 (tracking state class actions in Michigan). 
 92. For example, in a study of M & A class action lawsuits brought in Delaware courts in 1999 
and 2000, the authors found that 99% involved public companies, a number undoubtedly inflated by the 
ratio of public companies to private companies in Delaware and the focus on M & A activity.  Robert B. 
Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class 
Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133 (2004).  The findings are telling nonetheless. 
 93. See Marchand, supra note 91.  Utilizing the Westlaw docket database, the author tracked 
class action filings in three Michigan counties from 2000–2007.  The author found just two securities 
class actions that were not represented in the SCAS database.  Id. 
 94. This Paper includes a dataset that is different from that used by other research groups.  For 
example, the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearing House and NERA Economic Consulting track 
only (or at least primarily) federal securities class actions.  
 95. When reviewing reports involving class action filings, it is important to know what counting 
method the research firm employs.  For example, Cornerstone Research issues quarterly and annual 
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jurisdiction are counted as one action.  The rationale for tracking filings 
over this fifteen-year period is that the complaints demonstrate 
jurisdictional choices made by plaintiffs‘ counsel, and should measure 




reports analyzing federal securities class actions.  Utilizing data on federal class actions provided by the 
Stanford Securities Class Action Clearing House, Cornerstone counts multiple filings against the same 
defendants as a single filing.  See, e.g., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 
2010 YEAR IN REVIEW (2010), available at 
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2010_YIR/Cornerstone_Research_Filings_2010_Y
IR.pdf.  In contrast, NERA Economic Consulting, utilizing SCAS federal class action data along with 
other unique sources of filing information, counts different complaints against the same company in 
different jurisdictions as separate lawsuits (at least until the complaints are consolidated).  See DR. 
JORDAN MILEV, ROBERT PATTON & SVETLANA STARYKH, TRENDS 2010 YEAR-END UPDATE: 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS ACCELERATE IN SECOND HALF OF 2010; MEDIAN SETTLEMENT 
VALUE AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH (2010), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-
files/PUB_Year_End_Trends_1210.pdf.  Advisen, an advisor to D & O Insurance companies, maintains 
its own proprietary database of class action filings.  In its reports analyzing the data, Advisen counts 
each company for which securities violations are alleged in a single complaint as a separate suit and 
includes regulatory actions.  See, e.g., ADVISEN, 2010 A RECORD YEAR FOR SECURITIES LITIGATION 
(2010), available at https://www.advisen.com/downloads/sec_lit_Q42010_report.pdf. 
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B. The Results 
1. The Increasing Number of State Court Securities Class Actions 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the level of class action securities lawsuits filed in 
state court remained relatively constant from 1996 until 2005, when 
there was a demonstrable increase in the number of filings from an 


























Figure 1  
 State Securities Class Actions: 1996-2010 
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Figure 2 compares state securities class action filings to federal filings 
during the same time periods.  This comparison helps control for 
adverse economic events, such as the dot-com bust circa 2000 or the 
credit crisis circa 2008, which tend to increase securities class action 
filings generally.  Conversely, the comparison also controls for general 
positive market conditions, such as the overall market rise from 2002–
2008, which resulted in fewer securities class actions.  Figure 2 shows 
that the relative percentage of state securities class action filings to 
federal filings began to rise dramatically in 2005, and by 2010 the 
number of securities class action filings in state court outnumbered 
federal filings.96 
 
 96. Given the relative accuracy of the data tracking the number of federal filings as compared to 
data tracking equivalent state filings, which undoubtedly omits some claims, it is likely that the actual 
























Figure 2  
State Securities Class Actions 1996-2010 
Compared to Federal Class Action Filings* 
Federal
Filings
  PSLRA 
  (12/95) 
 CAFA 
 (2/05) 
  SLUSA 
  (11/98) 
* Federal filing data courtesy of NERA  
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Figure 3 demonstrates that the largest number of state securities class 
action filings occur in Delaware, followed by California, New York, and 
Texas.97  This finding is not particularly surprising given the number of 
companies incorporated, headquartered, or at least doing business in 
these four states.98  Usually, defendants in securities class actions 
include the entity itself; selected members of the board of directors; and 
designated corporate officers.  In general terms, a state court has 
personal jurisdiction over a corporation, and its directors and officers, if 
the entity is incorporated in the state or maintains its principle place of 
business in the state.99  On the other hand, these states may be slightly 
 
 97. These findings are consistent with a 2010–2011 study of M & A litigation for transactions 
valued at over $100 million.  See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER 




 98. More than half of publicly traded companies and more than half of the Fortune 500 
companies are incorporated in Delaware.  Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or 
Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 578 
(2002).  The top three states in terms of number of Fortune 500 companies headquartered in the state are 
California, Texas, and New York.  Annual Ranking of America‟s Largest Corporations, FORTUNE (Oct. 
10, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/. 
 99. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(b) (2011).  Also under the Due Process Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution, state courts can assert jurisdiction only over defendants who have the requisite 
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  SLUSA 
(11/98) 
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overrepresented in the data, given SCAS‘s relative ability to track filings 
in Texas and California, and the more readily available state trial court 
opinions in Delaware, California, and New York.100 
 
corporation incorporated within the state or maintaining its principal place of business within the state, 
―long-arm‖ statutes greatly expand personal jurisdiction to any corporation doing business with the 
state.  See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042 (West 2011) (―[A] nonresident does business in 
[Texas] if the nonresident: (1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to 
perform the contract in whole or in part in this state; (2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state; 
or (3) recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in [Texas], for employment 
inside or outside th[e] state.‖). 
 100. Other state courts that witnessed significant securities class action activity from 1996–2010 
include Florida with 46 filings; New Jersey with 42 filings and Illinois with 41 filings.   
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Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the securities class action complaints filed in 
state court in Delaware and California, the states with the largest number 
of filings. 
Figure 4 details the securities class actions filed in the Delaware 
Chancery Court from 1996–2010.  The number of securities class action 
filings in Delaware remained relatively constant until 2000, two years 
after the enactment of SLUSA, when filings more than doubled from the 
previous year.  In 2001, the number of Delaware class action filings 
retreated to pre-1995 (PSLRA) levels before rising to a record number 
of filings in 2010.  Interestingly, while the number of Delaware 
securities class actions has increased, the relative percentage of 
Delaware cases compared to those in other jurisdictions has fallen.101 
 

























Delaware Securities Class Action Filings: 1996–2010 
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In 1996 and 1997, in the immediate aftermath of the PSLRA, 
plaintiffs‘ counsel filed several securities class actions in California state 
courts.  This activity provided ammunition for those arguing that 
plaintiffs‘ attorneys were bringing their securities cases in state court to 
avoid the procedural hurdles mandated by Congress in 1995.102  At that 
time, the California courts appeared to recognize broad civil liability in 
connection with secondary market transactions that comprise the vast 
majority of stock drop class actions.103  Moreover, in 1996 California 
voters were considering a ballot measure to further extend civil liability 
in securities cases.104  Lobbying efforts by California- based issuers 
prompted Congress to enact SLUSA in 1998.105 
 
 102. The existence of the state court end run to avoid the mandates of the PSLRA is now 
enshrined in judicial opinions including those of the U.S. Supreme Court.  See Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 
547 U.S. 71, 81–82 (2006); see also supra note 33.  Among scholars, the empirical justification for 
SLUSA is debatable.  See supra note 34. 
 103. See Levine & Pritchard, supra note 34 (detailing the securities litigation climate in California 
in 1996 and 1997). 
 104. Id. (explaining California Prop. 211).  Ultimately, the California voters defeated the ballot 
measure.  See Bob Davis & G. Paschal Zachary, Election „96: Affirmative Action, Shareholder Lawsuits 
and Tax Increases Are Rejected By Voters, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1996, at A17.  Also, the California 
Court of Appeals limited liability in stock drop cases to defendants who were purchasers or sellers (or 
offerors) of the securities.  Murphy v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003).  
 105. High-tech companies located in Silicon Valley led the lobbying effort.  Leslie Eaton, The 
Silicon Valley Gang; An Influential Industry With Lots of Money Is Getting Its Way on Capitol Hill, 
N.Y.TIMES, June 11, 1998, at D1; see, e.g., Michael Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private 
State Securities Causes of Action, 50 STAN L. REV. 273 (1998) (providing empirical evidence of a shift 



























California Securities Class Action Filings: 1996–2010 
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2. Allegations in State Securities Class Action Complaints 




















With the exception of 1996, the vast majority of state securities class 
action filings from 1996–2010 involved M&A cases in which 
shareholders challenged some facet of a corporate acquisition.106  These 
class action complaints usually allege that the transaction price offered 
to shareholders is too low or, in the case of hostile acquisitions, that the 
target board is unfairly preventing the shareholders from selling their 
shares at a premium.107  In state court, the allegations are usually styled 
as a breach of fiduciary duty, or claims that the defendant company 
provided inaccurate or misleading information to the shareholders.  
Almost all of these M&A cases involve public companies with 
 
 106. These figures do not include state court derivative suits, which are expressly exempted from 
SLUSA.  15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(B) (2006).  Thompson and Thomas found that of the cases filed in 
Delaware courts in 1999 and 2000 alleging a fiduciary duty breach in connection with an acquisition 
transaction, 94% were styled as class actions rather than derivative suits.  Thompson & Thomas, supra 
note 92, at 167–69.  However, a more recent study of derivate suits filed in 2005 and 2006 found that 
many derivative suits were in fact filed in federal, where they perhaps escaped notice by other authors.  
Jessica M. Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: an Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1749, 1762 (2010). 
 107. Thompson and Thomas found that the vast majority (88%) of M & A class actions were 
shareholder lawsuits alleging a fiduciary duty breach resulting from an agreement to sell the company 
for too low of a price.  Thompson & Thomas, supra note 92.  The remaining 12 % of the lawsuits 





















































































Composition of State Court Class Action Filings:  
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nationally traded securities defined as covered securities under SLUSA.  
108 SLUSA, however, exempts M&A class actions from its preclusive 
provisions.  In a provision known as the ―Delaware Carve-Out,‖ SLUSA 
exempts from its coverage any otherwise ―covered class action . . . that 
is based upon the statutory or common law of the State in which the 
issuer is incorporated‖ under specified circumstances including M&A 
transactions.109 
 
 108. While these M & A transactions involve ―covered securities,‖ there may be a question 
whether some of these controversies involve misrepresentations in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security as contemplated by SLUSA.  The existence of the Delaware Carve-Out makes it 
unnecessary to address this issue. 
 109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(3)(A)(i)–(ii), 77p(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2006) (providing that SLUSA 
preclusion does not apply to a class action ―that is based upon the statutory or common law of the State 
in which the issuer is incorporated (in the case of a corporation) or organized (in the case of any other 
entity) may be maintained in a State or Federal court by a private party . . . if it involves . . . the purchase 
or sale of securities by the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer exclusively from or to holders of equity 
securities of the issuer, or any recommendation, position, or other communication with respect to the 
sale of securities of the issuer that—is made by or on behalf of the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer to 
holders of equity securities of the issuer; and concerns decisions of those equity holders with respect to 
voting their securities, acting in response to a tender or exchange offer, or exercising dissenters‘ or 
appraisal rights.‖).  CAFA also excepts from its preemptive scope these M&A cases involving covered 
securities, as defined in SLUSA.  CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(1) (2006). 
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Figure 7 compares the number of M&A class actions filed in state 
court with those filed in federal court.110  Allegations of 
misrepresentations in connection with M&A transactions are actionable 
under Section 14 of the 1934 Act,111 where jurisdiction remains 
exclusively within the federal courts.112  In the last decade, however, 
state courts have been the forums of choice to redress these grievances, 
and even the majority of M&A cases filed in federal courts are diversity 
cases alleging state law fiduciary duty breaches. 
  
 
 110. The federal filing data is provided courtesy of Luke Green at SCAS. 
 111. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), (e) (2006). 
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Figure 8  
Filings by State of Incorporation (2010) 
 State of 
Incorporation of all 
defendants 
State of Incorporation 
subset:  










Delaware 196  193 103 47 115 
Nevada  12 11  6 6  6 
New York  6 5  4 3  2 
California  5 5  4 3  1 
Maryland  5 5  3 1  2 
Other  38 3 26  12 
 
Figure 8 demonstrates that increasingly, plaintiffs‘ attorneys are 
choosing to file cases in multiple jurisdictions and often outside of the 
defendant‘s state of incorporation.  For example, of the 2010 M & A 
class action state court filings against Delaware corporations, 
approximately 18% were single, out-of-state filings; 23% were 
Delaware-only filings; and 58% were multiple filings where plaintiffs 
sued both in Delaware and out of state.113  Larger M & A transactions 
generate a correspondingly larger number of filings.  Cornerstone 
Research reports that in 2010 and 2011, litigation occurred in 91% of M 
& A deals valued at over $100 million with an average of 5.1 lawsuits 
per deal.114 
This data is consistent with a 2011 study of Leverage Buyouts 
(LBOs), a subset of merger and acquisition transactions, which found a 
drop in filings in the Delaware courts, even for entities incorporated in 
Delaware.115  Armour, Black, and Cheffins‘s report that in 2000, 76% of 
LBO cases involving Delaware companies were filed in Delaware 
courts.  Between 2003 and 2005, the number of Delaware filings 
dropped to 60%, and from 2006 forward, plaintiffs brought a majority of 
LBO cases involving Delaware corporations in other—almost 
 
 113. Similarly, for M& A transactions involving Delaware targets with value of at least $100 
million, only a small number of claims were filed solely in the Delaware Chancery Court.  
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97, at 6. 
 114. The very largest transactions during 2010 and 2011 generated 15–29 lawsuits each.  Id.  
Unlike the SCAS data, the Cornerstone Research Report includes derivative suits.  In another study of 
derivative suits filed in federal court during a 12-month period in 2005–2006, the author found 39 suits 
alleging violation of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, thus indicating an M & A objection suit.  Erickson, 
supra note 106, at 1762.  Over half of federal derivative suits in the study were accompanied by at least 
one parallel state court derivative suit.  Id. at 1827. 
 115. John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian R. Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing its Cases? 
(University of Cambridge Faculty Law, Research Paper No. 11/08, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578404. 
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exclusively state—courts.116  Legislative history suggests that at least 
some in Congress intended that SLUSA exempt only M & A class 
action complaints filed in the court of the defendant‘s state of 
incorporation.117  The text of SLUSA, however, is not so limited.  On its 
face the carve-out requires only that allegations are based upon the law 
of the state of incorporation.118  Consistent with SLUSA‘s statutory text, 
courts have unanimously concluded that cases alleging violations under 
the laws of the state of incorporation can be brought in any state court 
having jurisdiction over the defendants.119 
 
 116. Id. at 18–22.  In a follow up article, Armour, Black, and Cheffins reported similar results for 
mega M & A transactions.  John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware‟s Balancing Act 
(Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 37, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1677400; see also Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A Great Game: 
The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation(Apr. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1984758 (finding in a study of M & A deals 
completed between 2005 and 2010 and valued at over $100 million ―that Delaware is relatively 
unresponsive to attorneys who leave the jurisdiction in pursuit of more favorable fee awards‖ and that 
Delaware may indeed be losing cases to other jurisdictions). 
 117. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 13–14 & n.2 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (―It is the intention of 
the managers that the suits under this exception be limited to the state in which the issuer of the security 
is incorporated.‖).  Similar statements appeared in an earlier Senate Banking Committee Report: ―[T]he 
Committee expressly does not intend for suits excepted under this provision to be brought in venues 
other than the issuer's state or incorporation.‖  S. REP. NO.105-182, at 6 (1998). 
 118. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1) (2006). 
 119. See, e.g., Huang v. Reyes, No. C 07-5950 CRB, 2008 WL 648519 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (noting 
under plain text of SLUSA plaintiff need not bring suit only in state court of defendant‘s state of 
incorporation to fall within ―Delaware Carve-Out‖); Gibson v. PS Grp. Holdings, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
90,921 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (―Nothing in [SLUSA‘s] language suggests that Congress intended to restrict 
the venue of preserved class actions to the issuer‘s state of incorporation.‖); see also Davis v. Mich. 
Dep‘t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808 n.3 (1989) (―Legislative history is irrelevant to the interpretation 
of an unambiguous statute.‖). 
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b. IPO Claims: Sections 11 & 12 of the 1933 Act 
 
 
Earlier, this Paper reviewed the controversy surrounding the 
appropriate relationship between Section 11 IPO claims under the 1933 
Act, the preclusive provisions of SLUSA, and the preemptive provisions 
of CAFA.  Figures 9 and 10 indicate that despite the alarm bells 
sounding in some quarters, and the many scholarly articles addressing 
this issue, plaintiffs rarely pursue IPO claims in state court.  Since the 
enactment of CAFA in 2005, plaintiffs have filed very few Section 11 
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Figure 11 indicates that plaintiffs pursue relatively few class actions 
in state court outside of the M & A arena.  Allegations in state class 
actions not involving  
M & A or IPO cases arise from a wide array of misrepresentations 
with respect to non-traded securities, including Ponzi schemes, private 
placement offering fraud, suits against brokers, and breach of fiduciary 
duty claims apart from M & A transactions.  There is little doubt that 




 120. For example, in Oregon, an alleged Ponzi scheme involving the SunWest corporation 
resulted in two class actions in Oregon courts against the promoter and various secondary defendants yet 
the SCAS database features neither claim.  While the plaintiff classes far exceeded one hundred 
investors, these state actions involved non-covered securities, and did not fall under CAFA due to the 



































27 25 53 





Johnson: SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS IN STATE COURT
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012
378 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80 
IV. ANALYSIS OF STATE CLASS ACTION DATA 
There are few securities class actions filed in state court today outside 
of the M&A arena.  The low number of securities class actions in the 
―other‖ category is not particularly surprising quite apart from SLUSA 
preclusion or CAFA preemption.  Unlike Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 
and Rule 10b-5, most state blue sky laws do not provide for secondary 
market liability.121  In secondary market cases, plaintiffs allege losses 
due to misrepresentations and omissions of the issuer (corporations) 
even though the plaintiffs purchased (or sold) the securities from others 
in the secondary market.  While these claims are recognized under 
current Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence,122 the vast majority of state blue sky 
laws limit liability for securities fraud to privity-based transactions.123  
Also, state courts have uniformly rejected the fraud-on-the-market 
theory necessary to establish a presumption of reliance,124 which is 
integral to showing ―common issues of fact‖ at class certification.125  
These dictates of state blue sky laws largely relegate state class actions 
in the other category to privity-based seller/buyer fraud claims.  In 
combination with SLUSA and CAFA, the space for such actions is very 
narrow, limited to claims arising from non-SLUSA covered securities 
that involve either very small class actions or local controversies.  While 
several of these cases are missing from the database, this category by its 
nature is unlikely to spawn class action complaints in large numbers. 
Similarly, the data shows that Section 11 cases are rarely prosecuted 
in state court even after the enactment of the PSLRA.  In many respects, 
it might have seemed logical for plaintiffs‘ lawyers to file these claims 
 
 121. Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud: Gatekeepers in State Court, 36 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 463 (2011) (detailing liability under state blue sky statutes). 
 122. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (setting forth the elements of a cause 
of action under Rule 10b-5).  
 123. Only a very few states statutes provide a private cause of action against issuers in connection 
with secondary market transactions.  See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 59.137 (2010); Johnson, supra note 
121 (detailing primary and secondary liability for securities fraud under state blue sky laws). 
 124. For an explanation of the ―fraud on the market‖ presumption of reliance for class 
certification, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–50 (1988). 
 125. Both state and federal courts have reached near consensus regarding the unavailability of the 
fraud-on-the-market doctrine under state blue sky laws.  See, e.g., State v. Marsh & McClellan, 250 P.3d 
371 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the fraud on the market presumption not available to establish 
required reliance under Oregon law); Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., L.L.C., No. A-4598-07T1, 2009 WL 
2475314, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 14, 2009), rev‟d, 4 A.3d 561 (N.J. 2009) (―[A]pplication 
of [the fraud-on-the-market] theory is confined to federal securities fraud litigation.‖); Garcia v. Medved 
Chevrolet, Inc., No. 09CA1465, 2009 WL 3765481, at *10 (Colo. App. Nov. 12, 2009) (―We are also 
persuaded by a variety of state cases that have similarly rejected the invitation to apply a fraud on the 
market theory to presume reliance and causation in common law fraud or statutory deceit lawsuits.‖); 
Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 13 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998) (noting Delaware does not recognize a state 
cause of action for fraud-on-the-market). 
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in state court to avoid the PSLRA‘s procedural requirements.126  On the 
other hand, crowded state dockets and the general unfamiliarity of state 
court judges with federal securities law may have encouraged plaintiffs‘ 
attorneys to file in federal court.  Also, the increased flexibility for 
defendants to remove Section 11 cases to federal court under SLUSA or 
CAFA may keep the numbers down as plaintiffs‘ attorneys may not find 
the benefits of state court to be worth the expense of litigating remand 
motions against increasing odds of failure. 
The M&A data, on the other hand, raises several interesting issues.  
First, the sheer volume of M&A litigation is surprising.  As is typical 
following a recession,  
M&A activity increased in 2010.127  However, while the number of 
M&A deals increased by 20%, the number of merger-objection state and 
federal filings increased by a much greater percentage.128  Some of the 
increase is due to the multiplicity of filings for each deal, which, 
according to one informed observer, have ―grown substantially in the 
past five years.‖129  The SCAS data indicates that M&A suits involving 
the same deal increasingly take place in multiple state jurisdictions as 
well as federal courts.130  This suggests that at least for M&A 
transactions, CAFA is not reducing forum shopping in the manner 
 
 126. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2006). 
 127. Thomson Reuters data indicate that announced M&A deals increased nearly 20% in 2010.  
Quentin Webb & Denny Thomas, M&A Tops $2.2 Trillion in First Yearly Rise Since 2007, REUTERS 
(Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/17/us-deals-idUSTRE6BG00D20101217. 
 128. All researchers following M & A class action litigation report a substantial increase in 2010, 
regardless of the precise method utilized to count the lawsuits.  See, e.g., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97 (finding substantial increase in M & A litigation in recent 
years) ADVISEN, MERGER OBJECTION LAWSUITS: A THREAT TO PRIMARY D&O INSURERS? (2011), 
available at https://www.advisen.com/downloads/Merger_Objection_Suits.pdf (noting skyrocketing 
number of M & A lawsuits in 2010); MILEV ET AL., supra note 95, at 12 (noting filings alleging breach 
of fiduciary duty, two-thirds of which were M & A transactions, have nearly doubled); CORNERSTONE 
RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS, supra note 95, at 33 (―In 2010 there were 40 federal 
filings with allegations relating to M&A transactions, which was a 471 percent increase from the seven 
such filings in 2009.‖).  Press reports also document this increase in M & A filings.  See, e.g., Dionne 
Searcey & Ashby Jones, First the Merger, Then the Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2011 at C1. 
 129. Elizabeth Bennett, A Great Migration of M & A Cases Out of Delaware, DEL. BUS. CT. 
INSIDER (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.delbizcourt.com/story.php?story_id=3623&A-Great-Migration-of-
MA-Cases-Out-of-Delaware- (quoting Theodore N. Mirvis, Partner, Wachtell Lipton Rosen and Katz, 
New York, a major M & A defense firm); see also, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97, at 2–3 (finding that virtually every large M & A transaction in 2010 and 
2011 attracted multiple lawsuits). 
 130. See also Committee on Securities Litigation, Coordinating Related Securities Litigation: A 
Position,  Paper, ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 3 (Apr. 17, 2008), available at 
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Securities_Litigation_%20A.pdf (noting that in takeover transactions 
it was becoming common for similar fiduciary duty claims to be filed in multiple jurisdictions); Cain & 
Davidoff, supra note 116 (finding that in 71% of large merger transactions completed from 2005–2010, 
the target is incorporated in a state other than its headquarters state allowing plaintiff attorneys 
discretion over where to file suits). 
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predicted by its proponents.  
The multi-jurisdictional filing phenomena makes it difficult for the 
courts to manage cases, as there is no prescribed procedure for 
consolidation as would exist in the federal courts,131 or if multiple suits 
were filed in the same state jurisdiction.132  At present, there is no formal 
mechanism to coordinate suits among state courts.133  While state judges 
can consider forum non conveniens motions, and motions to stay in 
favor of parallel proceedings in other courts, these motions are not 
always successful.134  Similarly, there is no formal coordination between 
federal and state courts.135  Only under extraordinary circumstances can 
a federal court interfere with parallel state proceedings.  The Anti-
Injunction Act prohibits federal courts from enjoining parallel state 
court proceedings unless expressly authorized by an act of Congress, 
where necessary in aid of their jurisdiction, or to protect federal court 
judgments.136  If one of these statutory exceptions applies, the All Writs 
Act affirmatively authorizes federal courts to enjoin a state 
proceeding.137  Plaintiffs in federal securities class actions have 
 
 131. The multidistrict litigation (MDL) statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, provides that related class 
actions pending in multiple federal district courts can be transferred to a single federal district court for 
coordinated pretrial proceedings, including class certification and appointment of class counsel.  Also, 
under 28 U. S. C. § 1404, federal courts can transfer any civil action to any other district that would 
have jurisdiction ―for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.‖  
Federal courts can also obtain efficiencies through coordination. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 20 (2004). 
 132. Multiple suits filed in the same state court can be consolidated under state court procedures. 
See, e.g., CAL. CT. R. 3.767 (2011) (―In the conduct of a class action, the court may make orders 
that . . . [f]acilitate the management of class actions through consolidation, severance, coordination, 
bifurcation, intervention, or joinder . . . .‖). 
 133. Past efforts to institute a formal process for coordination among states have failed.  See UNIF. 
TRANSFER OF LITIG. ACT § 201, 14 U.L.A. 677 (1991) (proposing a uniform state statute to allow 
consolidation of actions pending in multiple state courts). 
 134. See, e.g., Rosen v. Wind River Sys., No. 4674-VCP, 2009 WL 1856460, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 
26, 2009) (refusing to dismiss Delaware suit in deference to earlier litigation filed in California); see 
also In re Topps Co. S‘holder Litig., 924 A.2d 951 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Topps Co., Inc. S‘holders 
Litig., No. 600715/07, 2007 WL 5018882 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 8, 2007) (explaining a situation where 
Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Chancery Court and New York Superior Court Justice Cahn 
both refused to grant a stay in favor of the action in the other jurisdiction); see also Tonnemacher v. 
Touche Ross & Co., 920 P.2d 5, 8 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).  In Tonnemacher, the court held, ―When 
actions are filed in different states, invoking the authority of independent sovereigns, neither sovereign 
is required to yield to the other.‖  Id.  (citations omitted). 
 135. See COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994) 
(proposing a Complex Litigation Panel that would have authority to remove related cases from state to 
federal court); see also Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison of the ALI Project 
with the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 LA. L. REV. 897, 905–06 (1994) (comparing potential 
approaches to interstate consolidation). 
 136. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006). 
 137. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides that ―[t]he Supreme Court and all courts 
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.‖  The All Writs Act is limited by the 
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occasionally tried to obtain injunctions against parallel state proceedings 
under the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act with varying degrees of 
success.138 
The problems associated with multi-forum litigation have engendered 
much recent commentary among academics and practicing attorneys.139  
Moreover, Delaware chancery judges are openly discussing these issues 
in court proceedings.140  Litigation in multiple forums wastes judicial 
resources as judges in two or more jurisdictions must review the same 
pleadings and documents, and are sometimes asked to decide the exact 
same motions.  When a case invariably settles, the settling judges must 
arbitrate fee disputes among any non-cooperating plaintiffs‘ counsel.  
Judges in non-settling forums may spend additional resources assuring 
the out of state settlement is not collusive.141  As recently noted by 
Chancellor Chandler: 
In the worse case, if a case does not settle or consolidate in one forum, 
there is the possibility that two judges would apply the law differently or 
otherwise reach different outcomes, which would then leave the law in a 
confused state and pose full faith and credit problems for all involved.
142
 
Second, defense counsel must litigate the same case in multiple 
courts, leading to obvious inefficiencies and increased costs.  Defense 
 
Anti-Injunction Act and in effect runs parallel to the second exception of that Act. 
 138. Compare Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 303 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting All Writs Act 
permitted federal district court to ―issue narrowly tailored orders enjoining repeatedly vexatious litigants 
from filing future state court actions without permission from the court‖), with Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. 
Morgan Chase & Co. 386 F.3d 419 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting principles of federalism dictate that federal 
court should not enjoin parallel state class action). 
 139. See, e.g., Ted Mirvis, Anywhere But Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests 
Some Solutions, 7 M&A J. 17 (May 2007); Armour, Black & Cheffins, Delaware‟s Balancing Act, 
supra note 115; David Marcus, Multiforum Mayhem, DEAL MAG. (Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/038069/2011/multiforum-mayhem.php; Mark Lebovitch, Jerry 
Silk & Jeremy Friedman, Making Order Out of Chaos: A Proposal to Improve Organization and 
Coordination in Multi-Jurisdictional Merger-Related Litigation (Dec. 31, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.blbglaw.com/misc_files/MakingOrderoutofChaos.;Edward B. 
Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who Caused This Problem, and Can It 
Be Fixed?, DEL. J. CORP. L., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 1. 
 140. See, e.g., In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S‘holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, slip op. at 9–10 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (noting the increasingly problematic fallout created by the rise of multi-forum deal 
litigation for which there is not yet a workable solution); In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S‘holders Litig., 
No. 6084-VCL, slip op. at 26 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2011) (stating that multi-forum issues are ―a problem in 
virtually every deal‖); In re Revlon, Inc. S‘holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945–46 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(describing the predictable and abusive multi-forum filing strategy as a ―Kabuki dance‖); Transcript of 
Status Conference, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 
2010) (suggesting possibility of   collusive forum shopping). 
 141. For example, in Scully, No. 5890-VCL, Vice Chancellor Landis retained special counsel to 
review the out-of-state settlement and instructed the parties to provide briefing on this issue. 
 142. In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S‘holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, slip op. at 10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 
2011). 
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counsel may have to appear at various hearings in multiple forums, 
respond to duplicative requests for discovery, and brief and argue 
duplicative motions.143  For defendants, multi-forum litigation can be 
disruptive and pose transaction risks, including the potential for 
inconsistent rulings.  Multi-forum litigation also creates an incentive for 
defense counsel (who are focused on completing the M&A transaction) 
to attempt a forceful consolidation of plaintiffs‘ cases, or to attempt to 
―divide and conquer‖ by settling with one plaintiff group.  Critics 
contend that defense counsel often try to cut a quick settlement deal with 
the ―weakest link‖ among plaintiffs‘ counsel,144 perhaps leading to a 
collusive settlement.145  Others argue, however, that defense motivations 
to settle in a particular jurisdiction are driven more by perceptions of 
which judge will respond most favorably to the defendant.146 
The lack of formal coordination among state and federal jurisdictions 
can also lead to problems among plaintiffs‘ counsel as they jockey for 
position and ultimately for fees.  Several theories explain plaintiffs‘ 
counsel propensity to file these cases in state as opposed to federal 
court, and to file in multiple jurisdictions.147  One theory is that 
plaintiffs‘ counsel believe that state courts will be more sympathetic to 
the interests of local claimants, especially in claims against out-of-state 
defendants.  This motivation has always driven forum shopping, and in 
part led to the adoption of CAFA.148  Plaintiffs‘ lawyers may also 
 
 143. Silk & Friedman, supra note 139, at 2. 
 144. See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S‟holdersLitig., 990 A.2d at 945, n.4 (―Firms who are early filers 
are frequently early settlers, leading some wags in the defense bar to label them ‗Pilgrims.‘‖ (citing 
Thompson & Thomas supra note 92); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat‘l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 
2002) (describing ―[T]he practice whereby the defendant . . . picks the most ineffectual class lawyers to 
negotiate a settlement.‖); In re Mobile Commc‘ns Corp. of Am. Consol. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 96, 
558, 1991 WL 1392, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 1991) (―[V]alid or strong claims may be settled too cheaply 
as part of an implied bargain with defendants that assures plaintiffs‘ counsel that there will be no 
opposition to payment of a generous fee.‖); De Angelis v. Salton/Maxim Housewares, Inc., 641 A.2d 
834, 838 (Del. Ch. 1993), rev‟d, Prezant v. De Angelis, 636 A.2d 915, 922 (Del. 1994) (―When 
competition among different sets of plaintiffs‘ counsel exists, as it does here, there is the ever present 
danger that unscrupulous counsel may ‗sell out‘ the class in order to receive a fee.‖).  
 145. See Brief of Special Counsel, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., No. 5890-VCL 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2011) (reviewing propriety of forum shopping and providing extensive discussion of 
―reverse auctions‖ and the potential for collusion in multi-forum litigation). For an earlier explanation of 
the dangers inherent in the settlement of multi-jurisdictional class actions, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class 
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370–72 (1995) (coining 
the term ―reverse auction‖ to describe collusive settlements). 
 146. Brief of Special Counsel, Scully, No. 5890-VCL, at 4 (noting defense counsel rarely forum 
shop to settle with weakest plaintiff, rather perceptions of judicial attitudes towards settlement or 
defendants‘ positions drive choice of settlement venue). 
 147. See, e.g., Cain & Davidoff, supra note 116 (finding in a study of large M & A deals 
completed between 2005 and 2010 that plaintiffs‘ attorneys bring suits in jurisdictions that award more 
favorable judgments and higher attorney‘s fees). 
 148. 28 U.S.C. § 1711(2)(a)(1)–(4) (2006) (highlighting ―bias against out-of-State defendants‖ 
among Congressional findings that motivated the Act). 
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believe that their own chances to maintain control of the case increase in 
uncoordinated state court filings.149  Also, the uncertainty of class 
certification and other issues in untested state trial courts could spur 
defense settlements. 
While the first class action settlement will ordinarily bind class 
members in other actions based upon the same claims,150 defendants 
often seek a global settlement as a precondition to settling with any 
plaintiff class.151  The desirability of this global settlement precondition 
provides leverage to plaintiffs‘ counsel who have filed in alternate 
jurisdictions to demand a significant portion of legal fees.  Even 
plaintiffs‘ counsel who filed and consented to a stay can free ride on the 
efforts of counsel in the settling jurisdiction. 
Finally, the data underscores the increasing trend of plaintiffs‘ 
attorneys to file class action cases against Delaware corporations outside 
of Delaware; a phenomena one commentator called the ―Anywhere But 
Chancery‖ effect.152  Commentators suggest that a major factor 
influencing this migration is that Delaware courts are becoming 
increasingly diligent in policing the conduct of lead counsel153 and the 
 
 149. See, e.g., In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S‘holder Litig., No. 6084-VCL, slip op. at 20 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 13, 2011) (―[W]hen everybody is filing in the same forum, you‘re not guaranteed to get control 
of a case.  But if you then go and file in another forum, you do have control of that case and then the 
defendants have to deal with you.  You may get control of the entire action but, at a minimum, you get 
control of a piece of the litigation for purposes of the fee negotiations.‖); In re Allion Healthcare Inc. 
S‘holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, slip op. at 10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (noting that plaintiff‘s counsel, 
unsatisfied with non-lead role it was offered in Delaware, refiled its case in New York); Armour, Black 
& Cheffins, supra note 116, at 33–36 (noting that first filers are more likely to keep control of litigation 
in states outside of Delaware).  In federal courts, the PSLRA governs the appointment of lead counsel 
under guidelines that eliminate many plaintiffs‘ lawyers from serious consideration. 15 U.S.C. § 78-
u4(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006). 
 150. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides that, ―Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.‖  Together with its 
implementing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (―The records and judicial proceedings of any court of 
any [] State . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States.‖), the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause requires both state and federal courts to honor state court class action 
settlements.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 375, 380 (1996) (directing that a federal 
court must honor a state court class action settlement even when the state court settlement released 
federal claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts).  For a recent summary of the 
preclusive impact of class action settlements, see Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational Class Actions and 
Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 330 (2011) (―[I]n the substantial majority 
of certified class actions that settle, the judgment approving the settlement will have limited, if any, 
issue preclusive effect, but it will provide robust protection against the prosecution of individual follow-
up suits arising out of the same factual predicate as the claims raised in the class action.‖).  
 151. Defense motivations driving global settlements include greater protection against future 
litigation and the elimination of non-settling plaintiffs‘ counsel as objectors at the class settlement 
hearing.  
 152. Mirvis, supra note 139; see also CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra 
note 97, at 5 (finding that 2/3 of lawsuits involving large M & A transactions involving Delaware targets 
were filed outside of Delaware). 
 153. See, e.g., In re Revlon S‘holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 956–64 (Del. Ch. 2010) (removing 
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award of attorneys‘ fees.154  For example, the Delaware courts no longer 
award lead plaintiff status to the first to file.155  Other explanations 
include Delaware‘s image as a manager-friendly state, and the 
perception of plaintiffs‘ attorneys that settlement values may be higher 
outside of the Delaware state courts, where results may be less 
predictable.156 
V. POTENTIAL OUTCOMES 
M&A objection class actions have replaced traditional stock drop 
cases as the lawsuit of choice for plaintiffs‘ securities lawyers.157  In 
many respects, from the perspective of plaintiffs‘ counsel, the M&A 
state class action suits are even better than the stock drop cases.  Like 
the traditional pre-PSLRA securities cases, they are filed quickly, 
usually within days of the announcement of an acquisition deal.158  
Unlike the prior cases, they also settle quite quickly, often within two or 
 
lead counsel for ineffective advocacy); King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 994 A. 2d 354, 357 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (criticizing the ―lead counsel Olympics race‖). 
 154. See, e.g., In re Cox Commc‘n S‘holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005) (reducing the 
award of attorneys‘ fees from $5 million to approximately $1.3 Million).  
 155. TCW Tech. Ltd. P‘ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., No. 18336, 19292, 19293, 2000 WL 
1654504, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (―[N]one of the pending lawsuits . . . is entitled to any special 
status as the lead or coordinating lawsuit simply by virtue of having been filed earlier than any other 
pending action.‖). 
 156. Armour, Black & Cheffins, in a follow up to their original empirical piece, suggest four 
factors contribute to the out-of-Delaware trend: ―(i) statements by Delaware judges betraying doubts 
about the nature of lawsuits plaintiffs‘ lawyers tend to bring (ii) Delaware judges began cutting plaintiff 
lawyers‘ fees; (iii) Delaware courts retreated from the ‗first to file‘ custom in choosing lead counsel; (iv) 
and (iv) plaintiffs‘ lawyers beginning to file tagalong derivative suits, usually outside Delaware because 
expedited discovery is often easier to obtain elsewhere.‖  Armour, Black & Cheffins, Delaware‟s 
Balancing Act, supra note  116, at 39–40.  Comments of Stuart Grant, a Delaware plaintiff‘s attorney, 
suggest that plaintiffs may bring marginal cases in other jurisdictions as they do not play well in 
Delaware.  Bennett, supra note 129; Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of 
Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 611 
(2006) (arguing that plaintiffs‘ attorneys‘ perceptions of judicial attitudes influence forum where cases 
are filed). 
 157. One commentator refers to the resilience of plaintiffs‘ counsel as the ―Whac-a-Mole effect‖ 
and notes that ―if certain avenues of mass litigation are foreclosed, [mass action litigators] find other 
avenues.‖  Erichson, supra note 9, at 1607. 
 158. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97, at 4 (finding 2/3 of 
lawsuits are filed within two weeks of an announcement); Searcey & Jones, supra note 128 (noting 
merger objection suits are started within hours of the M & A announcement); TCW Tech. Ltd. P'ship., 
2000 WL 1654504, at *3 (―Too often judges of this Court face complaints filed hastily, minutes or hours 
after a transaction is announced, based on snippets from the print or electronic media.  Such pleadings 
are remarkable, but only because of the speed with which they are filed in reaction to an announced 
transaction.‖); In re Topps Co. S‘holders Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 957 (Del. Ch. 2007) (―The reality is that 
every merger involving Delaware public companies draws shareholder litigation within days of its 
announcement.  An unseemly filing Olympiad typically ensues, with the view that speedy filing 
establishes a better seat at the table for the plaintiffs‘ firms involved.‖). 
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three months.159  Also, in the M&A class actions, defendants have added 
incentive to settle as soon as possible, not only to avoid litigation but 
also to complete the transaction at hand.160  Today most M&A objection 
suits seek injunctive relief, with attorney fees comprising the only 
monetary component of the settlement.161  Business lobbyists may 
convince Congress to view the M&A cases as a species of strike suit, the 
very situation that led to the PSLRA and SLUSA in the first place.162 
One potential result of the proliferation of multi-forum M&A 
objection suits is total congressional repeal of the SLUSA Delaware 
Carve-Out, thereby forcing these class actions into federal court where 
they will be subject to the procedural provisions of the PSLRA.  
Another less drastic solution would be for Congress to revisit SLUSA 
and restrict the carve-out to litigation actually filed in the courts of an 
entity‘s state of incorporation.  This would largely solve the multi-forum 
issue and, given Delaware‘s status as the leading state of incorporations, 
make the Delaware Chancery Court the sole forum for a majority of M 
& A cases.  There is evidence that Congress originally inserted the 
Delaware Carve-Out in SLUSA, and the internal affairs/corporate 
governance exception in CAFA, in light of the prestige and competency 
 
 159. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
 160. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97, at 9 (finding that 
over 2/3 of lawsuits involving large M & A transactions settle within 60 days); Brief of Special Counsel, 
Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., No. 5890-VCL, slip op. at 28 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2011) 
(―Settlements in multi-jurisdictional deal litigation are nearly always reached quickly—defendants 
trying to preserve their transactions need to resolve potential injunction motions before the deals 
close.‖). 
 161. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97, at 10–11 (finding that 
82% of the settlements of its sample settle for additional disclosures only plus attorneys‘ fees); 
ADVISEN, supra note 128 (noting few M & A objection suits result in monetary settlement).  Advisen 
reports that plaintiffs‘ attorneys collect an average of $500,000 per M & A objection suit.  ADVISEN, 
supra note 128; see also ADVISEN, supra note 95, at 2.  Stanford Law School Professor Joseph 
Grundfest, director of the Stanford Class Action Clearinghouse, attributes the increase in federal M & A 
filings to plaintiffs‘ lawyers scrambling for new business.  Karen Sloan, Securities Class Actions Inched 
Up in 2010; Those Targeting M&As Surged, NAT‘L L.J. (2011), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202478518537; see also Margaret Cronin Fisk, 
Merger Claims Drive Rise in Securities Class Actions, Study Says, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-20/merger-claims-drive-rise-in-securities-class-actions-
study-says.html. 
 162. ADVISEN, MANAGING RISK THROUGH THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY: AN ADVISEN BRIEFING 6 
(2011) (noting that some regard merger objection suits as strike suits designed to settle quickly without 
regard to the merits of the claim).  Indeed, harsh language in several Delaware Chancery Court opinions 
and proceedings comes very close to categorizing many M & A objection suits as ―strike suits.‖  See, 
e.g., In re Cox Comm'ns, Inc. S‘holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 608 (Del. Ch. 2005) (―[H]astily-filed, 
first-day complaints . . . serve no purpose other than for a particular law firm and its client to get into the 
medal round of the filing speed (also formerly known as the lead counsel selection) Olympics.‖); In re 
Revlon, Inc. S‘holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945–64 (Del. Ch. 2010) (replacing lead counsel and noting 
that they were ―frequent fliers‖ who did not litigate anything before entering into a settlement MOU 
with defense counsel).  
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of the Delaware courts.163  It is apparent that ―for one reason or another, 
Delaware‘s corporate law seems to enjoy great respect on Capitol 
Hill.‖164  Given the shift away from the Delaware courts, some question 
the viability of the Delaware Carve-Out as it currently stands.165 
Short of congressional action, states could help alleviate the multi-
forum litigation debacle by adopting a more formal system of state 
coordination.  State action could take the form of uniform laws or 
interstate judicial cooperation and communication.  Many state judges 
do communicate with one another in the case of duplicate class action 
filings, and attempt to agree which court should initially proceed with 
the litigation.166  Of course, at present, no rule or state compact compels 
cooperation.  Perhaps states that are major players in the class action 
arena could enter into a multi-state (or state/federal) compact that 
mimics the federal Multi-District Litigation Panel.  Certainly the 
―Anywhere But Chancery‖ trend should motivate Delaware to consider 
such a compact, but the inefficiencies in the current, uncoordinated state 
system should animate other states as well.167  Ultimately, only a 
national solution brokered by Congress would truly solve this multi-
forum dilemma, albeit at the cost of one more blow to federalism. 
Recently, we have witnessed some pushback from corporations that 
must defend suits in multiple jurisdictions.  Perhaps taking the hint from 
dicta in Vice Chancellor Laster‘s March, 2010 Revlon decision,168 some 
 
 163. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbioitc Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 1573 (2005) (noting that Delaware‘s Senator Carper was one of eight original 
sponsors, and one of a handful of Democratic supporters, of the Senate version of CAFA); Leo E. 
Strine, Delaware's Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying An Exquisite Jewel Or A 
Diamond In The Rough? A Response To Kahan & Kamar's Price Discrimination In The Market For 
Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1273–74 (2001) (suggesting expertise and efficiency of 
Delaware Courts may explain Delaware Carve-Out in SLUSA).  
 164. Kahan & Rock, supra note 163, at 1588. 
 165. See, e.g., Armour, Black & Cheffins, Delaware‟s Balancing Act, supra note 116, at 65–66; 
Committee on Securities Litigation, Coordinating Related Securities Litigation, supra note 130, at 9. 
 166. See, e.g., In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S‘holders Litig., No. 5022-CC, slip op. at 10 n.12 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (noting a preferred approach for defendants to file a common motion in all 
implicated jurisdictions asking the judges to confer and decide ―in the interest of comity and judicial 
efficiency, if nothing else, what jurisdiction is going to proceed and go forward and which jurisdictions 
are going to stand down and allow one jurisdiction to handle the matter . . . .  It is a method that has 
worked for me in every instance when it was tried.‖); In re ICX Techs., Inc. S‘holder Litig., No. 5769-
VCL, at 4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2011) (―I do think that in this brave new world of multijurisdictional 
proceedings, that the respective courts need to be kept informed about what‘s going on.‖); In re Burger 
King Holdings, Inc. S‘holders Litig., No. 5808-VCL, at 10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2011) (―It‘s simply a 
matter of making sure [the other court] has the information, because this is one of these many situations 
that we have these days, when there is multiforum litigation going on.‖).  
 167. C.f. Brian M. Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive 
Forum Provision (Boston Coll. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 112, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1699464 (suggesting an interstate compact as the solution but arguing that 
states other than Delaware would have little incentive to join). 
 168. In re Revlon, Inc. S‘holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (―Perhaps greater 
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companies have amended their bylaws or charters to provide that 
Delaware courts are the exclusive jurisdiction for settling intra-corporate 
disputes, including derivative and fiduciary duty claims.  Corporate 
advisors to Delaware corporations are increasingly recommending this 
strategy.169  Venue provisions in charters should pass muster because 
charter amendments require shareholder approval.  With the uncertainty 
of shareholder approval, however, many of the companies taking this 
route prefer to place the exclusive venue provision in their bylaws, 
which only requires approval by the board of directors.170  At least one 
federal court, however, refused to dismiss a derivative suit for improper 
venue against certain directors of the Oracle Corporation, even though 
the company had a bylaw in place granting exclusive jurisdiction of 
derivative suits to the Delaware Court of Chancery.171  While 
recognizing the validity of forum selection contracts, the court stated, 
―[O]racle cannot persuasively contend that its bylaws are like any other 
contract . . . while simultaneously arguing that it was permitted under 
corporate law to amend those bylaws in a manner that it could not have 
achieved under contract law.‖172 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted SLUSA and CAFA to preclude and preempt 
securities class actions in state court—and it has largely been successful.  
 
judicial oversight of frequent filers will accelerate their efforts to populate their portfolios by filing in 
other jurisdictions . . . .  If they do, and if boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular 
forum would provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations 
are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.‖).  
Before Revlon, the number of exclusive venue provisions in corporate charters and bylaws was quite 
low, but the popularity of these provisions has grown in recent months.  By December 31, 2012, 195 
public companies had adopted or were in the process of adopting exclusive Delaware charter and bylaw 
forum selection provisions.  CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF DELAWARE FORUM SELECTION IN 
CHARTERS AND BYLAWS (last updated Apr. 7, 2011), available at http:// 
http://www.ngelaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Exclusive_Forum_Provisions_Study_4_7_11.pdf. 
 169. See, e.g., Joseph Grundfest, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate Litigation: 
Mandatory and Elective Approaches (Stanford Law Rock Center for Corporate Governance, Working 
Paper No. 91, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690561); Latham & Watkins, Designating 
Delaware‟s Court of Chancery as the Exclusive Jurisdiction for Intra-Corporate Disputes: A New 
“Must” for Delaware Company Charter or Bylaws, CORP. GOVERNANCE COMMENT. 4 (Apr. 2010), 
available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub3510_1.pdf; see also Quinn, supra note 
167 (analyzing rationale of many companies who do not adopt such clauses). 
 170. ALLEN, supra note 168.  As of December 31, 2011, 35.4% of issuers who have adopted or 
are in the process of adopting exclusive venue provisions did so in their bylaws, while 55.9% proceeded 
or are proceeding by means of a charter provision.  Id.  However over 95% of the exclusive venue 
charter provisions were adopted as part of an IPO or other transaction that does not require shareholder 
approval. 
 171. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2011). 
 172. Id. at 1174. 
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In combination, these statutes leave little room for plaintiffs‘ lawyers to 
bring traditional securities stock-drop class actions in state court.  The 
data depicting class action filings in state court from 1996–2010 
confirms that very few traditional securities class actions now proceed in 
state court, and that they are primarily confined to local controversies 
involving private offerings.  Similarly, in spite of the theoretical 
controversy over the appropriate interaction between SLUSA and CAFA 
and Section 11 of the 1933 Act, very few IPO cases now proceed in 
state court. 
Regarding M&A transactions, the data tells a different story.  The 
number of M&A class action objection suits has mushroomed over the 
past few years and state court is indeed the preferred venue for this 
litigation.  Taking advantage of the SLUSA ―Delaware Carve-Out,‖ 
plaintiffs‘ counsel are filing merger objection class actions in record 
numbers and in multiple forums, usually alleging a violation of state 
fiduciary duty law or related violations under state securities statutes. 
This multi-forum litigation is causing increasing problems for 
defendants, the judiciary, and sometimes even for plaintiffs‘ counsel 
who must negotiate with uncooperative members of their brethren.  
Increasingly, Delaware judges are openly lamenting, if not criticizing, 
the multi-forum practice as Delaware loses cases to other jurisdictions. 
Merger activity continues to increase along with a corresponding 
increase in multi-forum M&A objection suits.173  Perhaps effective state 
coordination or self-help venue restrictions in corporate charters could 
help stem this tide.  Absent a major change, however, the proliferation 
of M&A objection suits is likely to come to the attention of Congress.  
Much like the alleged abuses concerning traditional securities class 
actions that led to the passage of the PLSRA in 1995, SLUSA in 1998, 
and CAFA in 2005, we should not be surprised to see congressional 
action eliminating or restricting the Delaware Carve-Out. 
 
 173. See, e.g., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 97, at 2 (finding 
the average number of merger objection suits for largest transactions rose from 5.4 in 2010 to 6.1 in 
2011). 
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